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Introduction
In a world bewitched with commodities, the problems Marx initially 
diagnosed in his works are still present and continuously plaguing our 
society. Capitalism has radically transforms every facets of modern life; 
there is “madness” in Harvey’s words. (Harvey, 2018) Roughly two 
centuries after Marx philosophized, he already saw the advent of uni-
versal alienation, exploitation of the workers, commodity fetishism, 
and inevitable financial crises. These phenomena have been endlessly 
hounding the modern man, lest the contradictions of the capitalist sys-
tem would be resolved. Marx provided the theoretical foundation to 
unravel this capitalist madness. 
As early in Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Marx (1992) 
saw the absurdity in the system that dehumanizes and alienates 
humanity to valorize the capital. Instead of living for the sake of 
humanity, we are living for the sake of the capital. Capitalism’s logic 
drives competition and overaccumulation at the expense of environ-
mental devastation; it forces migrant workers to leave their home and 
family for economic security. Its logic marginalizes the poor in the 
name of “development,” while creating meaningless and unfulfilling 
jobs for the sake of efficiency and productivity. 
Marx’s idealism continues to be an indispensable framework for 
emancipation that challenges the present alienating conditions. His 
recognition of how the subject participates in the construction of the 
comprehended reality is a vital aspect of his thinking to forgo. 
Despite of Marx’s explicit criticisms against the German idealists, 
his indebtedness to these thinkers, who set the context and foundation 
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of his idealism, is undeniable. Like Hegel, the progenitor of German 
idealism, Marx accepts the subject-object dialectical interaction, which 
includes the idealist assertion that the social subject practically and 
intellectually shapes its object, in other words, that the subject actively 
participates in making sense of the world. In the Manuscripts of 1844, 
Marx uncovers how subjective needs frame the subject’s understanding 
of reality. He unravels that underneath the pretension of objectivity of 
the science of political economy, the alienated need to profit shaped by 
the market competition outlines the limit of this science. Concurrent 
with the same idealist epistemology, Marx’s Theses on Feuerbach explic-
itly criticizes the old materialism, which simply thinks that matter is 
the fundamental reality; this materialism implies a realist epistemology, 
where knowing is a process of conceptually copying the matter and its 
structure independent of the subject. In the Theses, Marx criticizes that 
this mechanistic materialism annuls any active participation from the 
subject. While also criticizing the crude idealism that confines human 
activity and history solely in intellectual labor and reflection, Marx 
synthesizes the former and the latter in his new materialism that inte-
grates the subjective and the objective realities, this new materialism 
acknowledges that the subject practically and intellectually contributes 
to shape the reality. (Marx, 1972, 143) 
While idealism is apparent in Marx’s early texts, his later texts, espe-
cially Capital, are understood to have a different epistemological frame-
work. Althusser (2005) popularized what is termed as Marx’s 
“epistemological break”, the later Marx shifting to scientific work, 
purging his idealist heritage. In opposition to scientism, members of 
the Frankfurt school who are inspired and influenced by Marx retrieve 
the idealist facets of his philosophy to distinguish his thoughts from 
the oppressive Soviet Marxism. (Marcuse, 1985; Horkheimer & Adorno, 
2002) 
Although the Capital (1906) apparently articulates the laws, pro-
cesses, and contradictions of capitalism, sections such as Commodity 
Fetishism still leaves traces of idealism, which has been explicated by 
Lukacs (1971). Aside from that, the New Marx Reading retraces the influ-
ence of Hegelian categories to Marx and the all-encompassing laws of 
the Capital (Backhaus, 1980; Bellofiore and Riva, 2015), which is 
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balanced out by Negri’s rereading of the Grundrisse, underscoring that 
the role of the subject—workers movement and activity—is founda-
tional to the creation of the new movements of the capital. (Negri, 1989 
& 2014) Under these idealist frameworks, human beings are not merely 
objects helplessly determined by the natural necessities and economic 
forces; the agents, on the contrary, are given the space of freedom to 
react, reinterpret, and free themselves from the dominance of capital-
ism. (Mogach, 2017, 91) They are given space to think otherwise beyond 
the hegemonic framework of the capital.
Despite the critical relevance of Marx’s idealism, Marxism and 
Marx-inspired thoughts have often neglected and underemphasized 
idealism as an aspect of Marx’s thinking. Its status is often overlooked, 
as his philosophy is often confused with Engels’ positivist and materi-
alist-realist interpretations and with the failures and evils of Soviet 
Marxism. This disregard of idealism somehow originated from Marx 
himself, who constantly and explicitly disparages what he called as 
“uncritical idealism” he identifies with the Young Hegelians. (Marx, 
1992, 385) Because of the seeming non-idealist meaning of these 
remarks, Marx’s ideas were appropriated in a positivist and scientific 
light. His concepts are understood in a realist paradigm, where 
socio-economic movements and developments are understood like 
laws of nature existing independently of the subject. Engels started this 
realist line of reading, which was adopted by Soviet Marxism. It was 
then accepted as the official doctrine in the International Worker’s 
movements of the nineteenth century. (Cole, 1952; Torrance, 1995, 3-10; 
Rockmore, 2002, 3)
Idealist and materialist-realist readings are the two conflicting inter-
pretations of Marx’s epistemology. Because of Marx’s lack of lengthy 
discussion of his epistemology, most of the readings utilize key texts 
from his corpus to reconstruct his implied view on knowledge. Textual 
passages alone, however, are not sufficient basis of interpretation. With-
out any sense of context, his scattered remarks on knowledge could be 
framed to support both the idealist and realist readings. It is easy to 
interpret Marx’s idea of the dialectics of commodities either as a law 
existing in the market or as the subject’s-imposed comprehension of 
the socio-economic reality. Or that Marx’s metaphor of turning Hegel 
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upside down must be crudely understood as Marx publicizing his 
materialist-realism contrary to Hegelian idealism.
To address this difficulty, scholars settle the debate by being sensi-
tive to the context and historical shades of Marx’s thoughts, underscor-
ing how the philosophical and political discussions of his time shaped 
his ideas. Another way is to clarify the conceptual nuances of Marx’s 
ideas and to show progression of the Marxian debate. This kind of task, 
like what Wittgenstein did, shows that the misunderstanding is not 
real but product of confusion in the terms and concepts.  
The paper contributes to latter discussion to interpret Marx cor-
rectly. Focusing on the conceptual terms of the debate, it shows that the 
inability of the realists to recognize Marx’s idealist heritage is out of 
the realists’ limited understanding of the category of idealism in their 
reading. To prove the paper’s case, the first section starts with elucida-
tion of Marx’s concept of epistemological idealism as read by his inter-
preters. It shows the actual meaning of epistemological idealism as 
used by Kolakowski, Lukacs, and other idealist readers of Marx. The 
second section shows how the realists conflates the two idealisms, how 
the realist reading is erroneously grounded on failure to clarify the 
difference between the concept of ontological and epistemological ide-
alism. The third section highlights the differences between epistemo-
logical and ontological idealism. It explains that the Ontological 
idealism claims that idea is the fundamental reality (Kupers, 2013, 
1-10), while epistemological idealism suggests that knowledge is 
dependent upon the subject. (Ewing, 2013, 11-60) Under this idealism, 
the subject in some sense constructs the characteristics of the known 
reality. Realists think that the idealist reading shows that Marx is hold-
ing an ontological idealism, while in fact the idealist reading under-
scores the epistemological idealism of Marx. 
This conceptual or terminological inconsistency latent in the discus-
sion of Marx idealist-realist debate explains how realist readings of 
Marx persistently deny the presence of idealist epistemology in his 
philosophy, despite of its strong reason. As the confusions are cleared 
out, and the concepts are laid bare, then three things would become 
palpable. First, it further underscores that Marx’s philosophy should 
be separated from the materialist-realist readings especially of Engels 
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and the undemocratic regimes that publicized Marx as the foundation 
of their thinking. Second, real critique for and against Marx’s philoso-
phy could be appropriately made to further enrich his thoughts so that 
theoretical foundations will be more precise to address the problems 
of our times. 
Epistemological Idealism
The idealist reading of Marx emphasizes the presence of the post-Kan-
tian and constructivist subject in his philosophy. Popularly held by 
Kolakowski, Avinerri, and Lukács, for them Marx holds an epistemo-
logical idealist framework, which involves a constructivist view on 
knowledge. It views that the subject’s knowledge is in some sense pro-
duced or constructed by the subject. In other words, knowledge is sub-
ject-dependent, constructed or modified by the knower. 
Epistemological idealism can be traced from Kant’s critical philos-
ophy, culminating in a shift akin to Copernican revolution. Kant relo-
cated the source of knowledge from the objects as perceived by the 
subject to the subject as constructing what can be known. Contrary to 
Aristotelian epistemology commonly held during that time, Kant 
reconceived knowing from the object being the source of knowledge 
to the subject as the ground of knowledge. As result, he shows that 
human knowledge is limited to phenomena, i.e. to what is sensed and 
conceptualized by the faculties of consciousness and not to noumena 
i.e. to what the reality actually is. 
German Idealism took the Kantian epistemological view, extending 
the Copernican revolution. Hegel, who is its best representative, criti-
cized the ahistorical transcendental Kantian subject, articulating the 
historical subject. (Ameriks, 2000, 1-17; Pinkard, 2002) As he explains, 
concepts and categories of thought that made knowing possible are not 
a priori universal truths across cultures, rather these forms of thought 
are products of the dialectical and historical movement of ideas. Dia-
lectically speaking, the subject can be understood in view of the society, 
and society can be understood in view of the subject. The Hegelian 
subject, in comprehending the reality, acknowledges how his thoughts 
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are product of society and historical development of social reason; the 
historicized subject shows that the condition of knowledge is not uni-
versal but historical. 
There are differences in Kantian and the Post-Kantian tradition, but 
both are epistemological idealists given their constructivist view of 
knowledge, where knowledge is in some sense constructed and pro-
duced by the subject.  This form of idealism should be distinguished 
from the idealism that aspires for a better – or ideal reality. Although 
Marx seeks for the emancipation of a dehumanized society and aims 
for a better political and economic condition, this idealism is merely 
optimism and no way epistemological. 
What is more important to underscore is that epistemological ide-
alism should be differentiated from ontological idealism. Ontological 
idealism asserts that the nature of reality is fundamentally idea; it is 
often contrasted with materialism, which argues that reality is funda-
mentally matter. Although there is an interpretation that epistemolog-
ical idealism implies ontological idealism, since a 
subject-dependent-knowledge could suggest that even the “knowledge 
of existence” could be a mere idea of the subject, the epistemological 
idealism by itself, as a claim about knowledge, does not necessarily 
lead to ontological idealism. For example, Kantian epistemology main-
tains an independent noumenal world from the subject. Epistemolog-
ical idealism only maintains a subject-dependent-knowledge, which is 
clearly not an ontological idealist assertion. (Myers, 1997, 318)
The Conflation of Idealisms in the Realist Reading
The realist reading of Marx thrives on the lack of delineation between 
ontological and epistemological idealism earlier mentioned. Because 
the realist confuses his critique of ontological idealism as applicable to 
epistemological idealism, the realist readings—from Engels to Wood—
fail to address the significant point of Marxian epistemological idealism. 
Without drawing the distinction between two senses of idealism, the 
realists’ rejection of ontological idealism becomes also a rejection of epis-
temological idealism, which, however, is not evident in Marx’s works. 
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The realist reading of Marx asserts that knowledge and the charac-
teristics of reality is no way subject-dependent but independently exist-
ing outside of the knower. Knowledge is produced as the subject’s 
mind copies the outside structure of the reality. Early Marxists such as 
Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin, and Soviet Marxism and even the recent 
reading of Wood accepted this realist line of thinking. (Engels, 1946; 
Lenin, 1972; Tse Tung, 1965, 295-310; Wood, 2004)
Most of the realist readings restrict idealism ontologically without 
any hint of epistemological sense proposed by the idealist interpreta-
tions. The confusion of the realists about the meaning of idealism mud-
dled their understanding of Marx’s epistemology. 
In Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy, 
Engels confines idealism in its ontological meaning. He argues that 
idealists are “those who asserted the primacy of spirit to nature,” and 
they think that the creation of the world is out from the mind, idea, or 
God. For Engels, idealism simply means that idea, not matter, is the 
fundamental reality; idea is the cause of matter and not otherwise.  In 
Engels’ framework, idealism is one of the two major answers to the 
greatest question of philosophy, the question concerning the relation 
of “thinking and being.” He explains that philosophers have been 
divided into two major camps: the materialists who assert the primacy 
of being and the idealists who assert the primacy of thinking. 
(Engels,1946, 16-18) 
As Engels limits the sense of idealism ontologically, he then con-
cludes that Marx does not subscribe to any form of idealism. Out of 
this simplistic distinction, Marx is seen as anti-idealist, who is primar-
ily influenced by Feuerbach’s materialism, which views that matter is 
the primary cause of reality. This materialism, for Engels, is the ground 
of Marx’s assertion that reality can be explained through the material 
economic condition.  Through this framework, Marx is interpreted as 
resolving the theoretical contradictions of idealism by showing that its 
root is nothing but a form of theology. Here, idealism is understood as 
baseless assertion, since it is seen as grounded on the survival of the 
belief of an extra-mundane creator. (Engels, 1946, 80-81)
 Engel’s realist appropriation of Marx and his limited concept of 
idealism have influenced most of the next realist readings of Marx’s 
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texts. Engels’ distinction between materialism and idealism has become 
the basis of interpretation of the Marxists. Part of its popularity was its 
utter simplicity in its distinction of both concepts. Materialism is 
defined as the assertion that matter causes idea, and idealism is con-
ceived as the view that idea causes matter.  Aside from being simple, 
Marx’s lack of systematic discussion of his epistemological views 
largely explains why scholars rely heavily on Engels’ conceptualiza-
tions. (Avineri, 1968, pp. 65-66) Both Plekhanov and Lenin, for instance, 
follow Engels’ concept of idealism, which also lead them to reject 
Marx’s form of idealism, including the epistemological sense of the 
concept. 
Influenced by Engels, Plekhanov distinguishes idealism from Marx’s 
materialism. He thinks that any form of idealism, such as Hegel’s and 
Kant’s transcendental idealism, reduces everything to thought, as both 
conceive “being, matter, and nature” as either postulate of “Idea” (for 
Hegel) or of “Reason” (for Kant). Both Kant and Hegel’s ideas, for 
Plekhanov, are closely akin to a “theological concept,” a view that 
“nature was created by God,” or “reality, matter,” is created by “an 
abstract, non-material being,” or “world’s law is dictated [...] by divine 
Reason.”(Plekhanov, 1976, 117-118) In both senses, it means that the 
reality is created by mind.
Lenin, like Plekhanov, also defines materialism against the backdrop 
of idealism, which he termed as the Empirico-criticism held by Mach 
and Avenarius. For Lenin, Empirico-criticism has cloaked Berkeley’s 
idealism, since it remains grounded on the idea that existence is created 
by perception, esse est percipi. He criticizes this form of idealism because 
of its absurd logical implications. The end of Berkeley’s idealism is 
solipsism, since when everything is conceived as one’s personal idea 
based on personal perception, then even the human existence would 
become a product of one’s idea. In his ironic remark, Lenin expresses 
this view that “if bodies are ‘complexes of sensations’ …or ‘combina-
tions of sensations’ as Berkeley said, it inevitably follows that the whole 
world is but my idea.” (Lenin, 1972, 34)
Engel’s realist influence has extended even to the recent readings of 
Wood of Marx. In Philosophical Materialism, Wood even defends Engels’ 
idealist-materialist distinction to be correct despite of its inadequacy. 
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He argues that “Engels’ rather Manichean distinction between idealism 
and materialism may be a simplistic and philosophically unsophisti-
cated, but it is not wholly misguided. (Wood, 2004, 167)” Engels’ real 
purpose, he explains, is to be an aid for delineating the concepts. By 
defining the categories simplistically, Engels made a clear distinction 
between the materialist outlook from the “traditional religious out-
look” and the supernatural explanations. (Engels, 1946, 166-167)
By following Engels` categories, Wood disassociates Marx from any 
form of idealism. He also dismisses Marxian idealist account because 
like Engels, the very concept of idealism gives him an impression that 
it is related to some supernatural view. In Engels-like argument, Wood 
points out that Marx cannot be identified with idealism, given that 
idealism is a Hegelian notion where “nature is ‘posited’ by cosmic spirit 
as its ‘externalization’.” (Wood, 2004, 190-191) For him, Idealists main-
tain that “God created the world,” and “the separation of soul dwelling 
in the body and leaving it at death,” which cannot be identified as 
Marx’s ideas. (Wood, 2004, 166)
 Against idealism, Wood reads that it is more plausible that Marx is 
a naturalist and a realist. He further bases this realist reading on the 
assertion that Marx embraces “historical materialism,” a view that 
“rests on the idea that the deepest and most historically potent human 
interests lie in developing people’s natural powers to shape the world, 
and not in looking after the supernatural destination of their souls.” 
(Wood, 2004, 168-169) It means that Marx is neither a supernaturalist 
nor a mystic, and this philosophical view brings him closer to materi-
alism and realism.
A close analysis of the categories of Engels, however, reveals that 
his simplistic conceptual distinction cannot be reliable when one aims 
to clarify the nuanced epistemology of Marx. The categories, which are 
set by Engels, limit the possible reading of Marx, since it is focused only 
on the extremes of idealism and materialism without the intermediate 
views available. Engels identifies the primacy of thought and primacy 
of being as mutually exclusive alternatives. As a result, he fails to dis-
cuss any form of epistemological idealism, which is different from the 
concept of idealism he is espousing. He lacks an articulation of idealism 
that originated from Kant, and if he has ever mentioned him, it is in 
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the context of interpreting the philosopher as an agnostic who thought 
the reality is unknown. Kantian epistemology is only viewed in its 
ontological claim, the view that reality is an unknown “noumenal 
realm,” neglecting his assertion of a subject-dependent knowledge, the 
epistemological idealism.
The Difference between Ontological and Epistemological idealism
The realists are certainly correct when they say that Marx does not hold 
any form of ontological idealism. Even in the Manuscripts, Marx (1992) 
explicitly states that he does not subscribe to the view that reality is 
fundamentally idea; he even refers to it as “uncritical idealism,” the 
view where the idea functions as a demiurge that creates the material 
reality. (Marx, 1992, 385) The realists, however, conflate two idealisms 
into ontological idealism and this should be critically examined. 
The realists’ failure to elaborate epistemological idealism has led 
them to an unwarranted deduction that Marx should be distanced from 
any form of idealism. Without elaborating epistemological idealism, 
the realists have neglected an important insight that Marx held, which 
led them to miss the point of Marxian idealists like Kolakowski. For 
instance, Wood, who reads Marx as a realist, refutes ontological ideal-
ism, which he erroneously ascribed to Kolakowski and other Marxian 
idealists. This tendency of conflating idealisms is common in the real-
ist readings of Marx. What they are criticizing is a simplified and crude 
interpretation of Hegel’s and Berkeley’s idealism, which cannot be 
identified with the idealist readings of Marx.
Against Marx-Engels’ realism and its followers, Marxian Idealists 
do not hold supernaturalism and mysticism. In fact, like the realists, 
Marxian idealists also reject identification with uncritical idealism and 
Berkeley’s idealism. For instance, Avineri reads Marx as an idealist 
epistemologically, but he maintains his materialist ontology. He 
explains that although Marx has advanced the idea of the objective and 
independent existence of the material reality, the philosopher manages 
to maintain the idealist epistemology where subjects modify what they 
perceive. (Avineri, 1968, 65-66)
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Like Avineri, Lukács reads Marx as an idealist who maintains the 
existence of an “objective social reality.” For him, although Marx thinks 
that perception of the social reality is dependent on subject’s class (i.e. 
one’s context and condition), it does not mean that the Marxian view 
thinks that reality is produced by ideas alone or by an Absolute or Geist. 
Both the bourgeois and the proletariat perceive the same reality imme-
diately (without theoretical constitution), but the mediation of their 
different class standpoint creates a varying perception of reality. As 
Lukács (1971, 150) writes, “…the objective reality of social existence is 
in its immediacy the ‘same’ for both proletariat and bourgeoisie. But 
this does not prevent the specific categories of mediation by means of 
which both classes raise this immediacy to the level of consciousness, 
by means of which the merely immediate reality becomes for both the 
authentically objective reality, from being fundamentally different, 
thanks to different position occupied by the ‘two’ classes within the 
‘same’ economic process.” 
Kolakowski, another Marxian idealist, reads Marx under the same 
idealist epistemology. He clarifies that Marx’s epistemology does not 
assert that the mind literally creates existence of things. Mind, rather, 
only provides a modified perception of reality, yet it never denies the 
existence of independent things. Kolakowski (1968, 45-46) explains 
that for Marx “human consciousness, the practical mind...does not 
produce existence,” yet this same mind “produces existence as com-
posed of individuals divided into species and general.” He reiterates 
that mental concept is different from actual existence. “It does not 
follow,” – he adds - “that to be ‘thought of’ is the same thing as ‘to be’.” 
It means that there is still an actual existence of things, which he refers 
as the “force of opposition,” the reality that the human beings must 
engage and “must overcome” to satisfy their needs. (Kolakowski, 1968, 
45-46)
Clearly, the Marxian idealists maintain in a certain sense that objects 
exist independently of the subject. Although they see that Marx holds 
the idea that the subject in some sense modifies reality, they make a 
conscious effort to distinguish between the idealism that views a sub-
ject-dependent knowledge from the idealism that asserts that conscious-
ness produces the reality out of nothing. Contrary to the latter, they 
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never deny the existence of things, or reduce their existence into mere 
idea. The idealist readings underscore how Marx re-establishes the 
objective existence of things through his critique of Hegel’s philosophy. 
Conclusion 
As an idealist, Marx does not assert that the subject directly creates 
knowledge and reality, he rather views that the subject contributes to 
the construction of knowledge in a certain manner. The contribution 
does not only come from practical labor, e.g. a worker transforms wood 
into table or mountain into a building, but also through cognitive activ-
ities, that is, by understanding the reality in a set of categories produced 
by human being existing in a specific socio-economic condition. This 
kind of idealism is not the same with the crude idealism Marx and the 
realist Marxists are criticizing.  It does not assert an ontological ideal-
ism, where everything is ideas, and the reality is the externalization of 
the mind and ideas ex nihilo. 
One must recognize an epistemological idealism in Marx, since only 
in this context one can start to authentically engage and criticize his 
ideas. Various propaganda has maligned Marx, including his profound 
writings, identifying them with totalitarian regimes. Marx’s ideas have 
been subject of simplification, which started from Engels, and due to 
its uncomplicatedness, these readings have become more influential 
and popular. By underscoring Marx’s idealism, it shows a clear diver-
gence between Marx’s philosophy and the ideas of Engels, the Soviet 
Marxists and other realist Marxists. The simplified dichotomy between 
idealism and materialism, as a framework to understand Marx, con-
fuses and obstructs one to approach the real thoughts of Marx. Such 
framework does not include other categories of idealisms, which are 
historically, philosophically, and conceptually more profound than 
what Engels and Marxism have thought.
As the realist reading unceasingly reveals to be untenable, then the 
idealist framework can show how to revitalize the critique against the 
capital, to engage its alienating forces, since the point, after all, is to 
change it. Man is not a slave of economic determinations; man can 
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modify the world in order to humanize it. The change, however, occurs 
not only through practical activities of the bodies, where cognition’s 
role is to be a passive reflector of what is “out there”. Marx shows that 
cognition actively contributes to shape our interpretation of the world, 
and thus, such idealism provides a space for freedom to subvert the 
alienating world also through cognition. Cognition and its develop-
ment have critical roles to play for changing and humanizing the world. 
Against the pretension of objectivity of the science of political economy, 
Marx argues the need to humanize our thinking to show the alienated 
needs latent in our theories. To interpret the world is insufficient, for 
there’s a constant need to reinterpret it. The quest for societal change 
not only requires us to act but also to challenge the assumptions and 
foundations of our thinking. It requires us to be conscious, not only of 
the information we have in this world, but also of the interests and 
needs our cognition serve. 
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